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Abstract
Trust in individuals is strongly guided by group membership; ingroup favouritism in trust is a very robust finding in the literature
on pro-social behaviour. We know, however, that group attitudes can change based on discrete encounters with group members
(i.e., intergroup contact). This research examines how people use previous experiences with ingroup and outgroup members to
inform decisions to trust novel, unknown group members. This process, which we refer to asmember-to-member generalisation,
was examined in two studies using a student sample (N = 135) and a larger and more representative online sample (N = 226). The
moderating effects of group membership (ingroup vs outgroup vs unknown) and interaction valence (positive vs negative) on
member-to-member generalisation were explored in ten sequential Trust Games. We examined changes in investment behaviour
based on feedback from the previous partner, where feedback was either positive (high reciprocation) or negative (no recipro-
cation). We observed consistent evidence for member-to-member generalisation. People did not just rely on initial group attitudes
to guide their trust behaviour, but adjusted their behaviour towards novel individuals based on previous experiences.
Generalisation was stronger for interactions that were negative and seemingly unexpected. When people showed strong distrust
of the outgroup (Study 1) or were highly identified with the ingroup (Study 2), they changed their behaviour towards novel
partners more after experiencing incongruent interactions. These findings are discussed in relation to intergroup contact theory,
outgroup homogeneity, and expectancy violation effects.
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Imagine that you, a non-Muslim, are travelling by train for a
business meeting. A Muslim man wearing traditional clothing
takes a seat next to you. You start chatting, and before you
know it, you have talked to him for the rest of your journey,
having a pleasant conversation about many topics. When you
get off the train and get to your business meeting, a Muslim
woman wearing a headscarf greets you. From intergroup con-
tact theory, it is assumed that the pleasant interaction with the
Muslim man on the train changes your attitudes towards
Muslims as a group. However, does your behaviour towards
other members of the group also change, such as the Muslim
woman at the meeting? Does intergroup contact also general-
ise to improve pro-social behaviour towards novel group
members?
The effect of group membership on pro-social behaviour is
well-established; people generally demonstrate ingroup
favouritism (Balliet et al. 2014), and display distrust and dis-
criminatory behaviour towards disliked or rival outgroups
(Dovidio et al. 2002a, b). Research surrounding intergroup
contact theory, however, demonstrates that our feelings to-
wards outgroups become more positive or negative based on
interactions with individual group members (Brown and
Hewstone 2005; Graf et al. 2014; Pettigrew 1998). What is
yet unknown, is how experiences with individual group mem-
bers directly influence behaviour towards novel group mem-
bers whom one has not interacted with before. In this research,
we focus specifically on member-to-member generalisation,
exploring how people generalise their experiences with indi-
vidual group members to trust other individuals from the same
group. We describe two experiments that examined member-
to-member generalisation in the context of trust behaviour. We
examine how groupmembership (ingroup vs outgroup vs con-
trol) and valence during interactions (positive vs negative) in-
fluence generalisation of trust towards novel group members.
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Ingroup Favouritism in Trust
Trust is essential in interactions and social relationships and is
a strong predictor of cooperation between individuals and be-
tween groups (Balliet and Van Lange 2013). Trust indicates
that people have positive expectations about the behaviour
and intentions of the other person (Lewicki et al. 2006;
Rousseau et al. 1998). A common way to study trust between
individuals is to examine investment behaviour in the Trust
Game (Berg et al. 1995). Here, a trustor is given an endow-
ment that he/she can invest in a trustee. If the trustor invests
his/her endowment, the amount is multiplied and given to the
trustee. The trustee then has the choice to reciprocate trust by
returning some of the received amount to the trustor, but he/
she does not have to. Both players can end the game with
more money than they started out with, but only if they both
cooperate.
Contrary to the predictions from Game Theory (in which
the Brational^ behaviour is not to return, and therefore not to
invest any money), people generally display both trust and
trustworthiness (i.e., investing and returning money) in this
game (Camerer 2003). Trust occurs in single game interac-
tions with strangers, but is particularly prevalent in repeated
interactions when the interaction partner reciprocates trust
(King-Casas et al. 2005). Reciprocal altruism, in which people
may temporarily incur some cost for a behaviour (such as
trust) in order to increase the chance that others may return
the favour is considered evolutionary sound (Trivers 1971).
Trust is most commonly withdrawn after non-reciprocation, a
strategy called the Btit-for-tat strategy^ (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981). One of the most powerful rules of behaviour
is that people are kinder to people in their own groups than to
people in their outgroups. In both laboratory and real-world
situations, people tend to show preferential treatment of
ingroup members compared to outgroup members (Brewer
1999; Tajfel and Turner 1979). In a large-scale meta-analysis,
Balliet and colleagues found a robust effect of group member-
ship on cooperative decisions in different types of mixed-
motive games, showing higher trust towards ingroup mem-
bers than outgroup members (Balliet et al. 2014). Ingroup
favouritism in trust has been observed in different group con-
texts, including groups defined on the basis of race (e.g. Burns
2006), nationality (e.g. Stoddard and Leibbrandt 2014), or
religion (e.g. Rotella et al. 2013), as well as in a minimal-
group setting (Buchan et al. 2006).
Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel and Turner 1979) offers an
explanation for the above effects. SIT posits that the groups to
which we belong form an important part of our identity and
serve to partially fulfil belonging and self-esteem needs. As
group memberships form an important part of our self-
concept (Smith and Henry 1996), we are motivated to belong
to positively-valued groups and to see our ingroups in a positive
light. That is why we often favour ingroup members over
individuals from outgroups. Research in this tradition has
established that people are motivated to treat ingroup members
positively and consider deviants to be aberrations who need to
be removed from the ingroup (e.g. Marques et al. 1988).
In addition to ingroup favouritism, intergroup bias also
extends to perceptual and judgment biases. Ingroups are gen-
erally perceived to be variable and heterogeneous, whereas
outgroups are perceived to be more stereotypic, more homo-
geneous, and thus more similar to each other. This intergroup
difference in perceived variability is commonly referred to as
the outgroup homogeneity effect (Judd and Park 1988; Ostrom
and Sedikides 1992; Park and Rothbart 1982). This effect may
occur because perceivers have less motivation to attend to
differences between outgroup members than to differences
within their group (Haslam et al. 1995).
Changing Group Attitudes and Person
Impressions
While people generally tend to favour their ingroup and per-
ceive outgroups as stereotypic and homogenous, attitudes of
outgroups change through experience, as intergroup contact
theory (Allport 1954; Brown and Hewstone 2005; Pettigrew
1998) shows. The central premise underlying intergroup con-
tact theory is that positive interaction with an outgroup mem-
ber, as a representative of their group, has the potential to
reduce prejudice not only towards that specific outgroup
member, but also toward the outgroup as a whole. This type
ofmember-to-group generalisation has been robustly support-
ed in the literature (Davies et al. 2011; Lemmer and Wagner
2015; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Effects are strongest when
the contacted person is regarded as typical of the outgroup and
when respective group memberships are salient.
In addition to changing group attitudes from personal con-
tact, information about individual group members can also
directly transfer to other individuals in a process referred to
as attitude transfer (Crawford et al. 2002; Ranganath and
Nosek 2008). Crawford and colleagues (Crawford et al.
2002) showed that people generalise information about group
members of highly entitative groups (i.e., groups that are per-
ceived to a unified entity) to other group members, because
these individuals are perceived as interchangeable parts of the
group. Such transfer does not occur for low entitativity groups
(Crawford et al. 2002). Furthermore, Ranganath and Nosek
(2008) showed that generalisation of traits from one group
member to another is a process that occurs automatically on
an implicit level, even when it is resisted on an explicit level.
Most relevant to the current research, implicit attitude
transfer has been found to occur more strongly for outgroup
members than ingroup members, particularly when the infor-
mation presented about outgroup members is negative (Ratliff
and Nosek 2011). These findings are likely due to a
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combination of outgroup homogeneity and negativity biases.
When members of the group are perceived as similar to each
other, information about one group member is more readily
transferred to other individuals. Negativity biases indi-
cate that in general, people are more sensitive to nega-
tive than positive information (Baumeister et al. 2001;
Rozin and Royzman 2001; Skowronski and Carlston 1989).
In particular, negative information has been shown to be gen-
eralised more quickly than positive information (Fazio et al.
2004; Shook et al. 2007). Therefore, attitudes formed
about individual group members are transferred more
readily when individuals are outgroup members, and
when the information about the individuals is negative
(Ratliff and Nosek 2011).
The Current Research
The above literature demonstrates that 1) our feelings about
ingroups and outgroups influence responses to individual
group members (Balliet et al. 2014), and 2) experiences with
individual group members can change our attitudes towards
the group as a whole (Brown and Hewstone 2005). However,
intentions and attitudes only have utility if they predict actual,
subsequent behaviour (see Herek 1986). It has been shown that
there is sometimes a disconnect between attitudes and behav-
iour (Sheeran 2002). People who want to be nonprejudiced
may avoid intergroup contact (Plant and Devine 2003) and
may even can behave in a prejudicial or discriminatorymanner
(Fehr and Sassenberg 2009). Unfortunately, less intergroup
contact research has directly measured behaviour towards an
outgroup member (cf. Finseraas et al. 2019), and much of this
work relies on self-reports of previous contact experiences and
attitudes or mentally simulating positive contact (e.g. Meleady
and Seger 2017).
It is yet unknown how experiences with individual group
members directly influence behaviour towards novel group
members, a process we refer to as member-to-member
generalisation. In the current research, the Trust Game para-
digm was adapted to measure how people generalise their
experiences with group members in their trust behaviour to-
wards novel individuals from the same group. We manipulat-
ed two elements of the Trust Game; group membership and
interaction valence.
Firstly, group membership was manipulated through
political affiliation. Participants either played the game
with partners that shared their political affiliation (the
ingroup), that supported an opposing political party
(the outgroup), or with partners with unknown political
affiliation (the control). Political affiliation has frequent-
ly been used in research on social identity and inter-
group relations (e.g. Brewer 1999; Deegan et al. 2015;
Hackel et al. 2014; Riek et al. 2010). Based on pilot research
with student samples,1 it was predicted that participants would
feel strongly towards political groups and that it would be
more acceptable to explicitly express dislike of the political
outgroup than it is of other outgroups such as national, ethnic,
or religious groups (also see Iyengar and Westwood 2015).
We selected a natural group (instead of minimal groups) as
we were interested in how pre-existing group knowledge
and biases influence member-to-member generalisation.
Secondly, valence of game interactions was manipulated by
providing feedback about group members’ reciprocity behav-
iour. Some game partners reciprocated trust (positive interac-
tions), while others violated trust (negative interactions).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The main aim of this research was to establish whether people
generalise their experiences with previous group members in
their trust behaviour towards other, novel group members. In
terms of the Trust Game paradigm, this question was analysed
by examining how much people change their trust behaviour
towards different group members throughout the game. Do
people change their trust and expectations in novel group
members after their trust is reciprocated or violated by a dif-
ferent member of the same group?
Hypothesis 1: People will increase their investments in
novel group members following trust reciprocation by
other group members and decrease their investments in
novel group members after trust violation.
After establishing whether people generalise their experi-
ences with previous group members to novel partners, we
aimed to determine if the process of member-to-member gen-
eralisation differs for ingroup and outgroup members.
Therefore, we examined how both outgroup and ingroup gen-
eralisation compare to a control condition where no group
membership information was available. Work on group
entitativity (Crawford et al. 2002) suggests that member-to-
member generalisation would be greater when a group cate-
gory is provided compared to the control. This effect is pre-
dicted to be particularly pronounced for the outgroup, due to
the outgroup homogeneity effect (e.g., Judd and Park 1988).
Hypothesis 2: Group membership will moderate member-
to-member generalisation of trust behaviour. Generalisation
will occur more strongly when group membership is pro-
vided, and particularly pronounced for the outgroup.
1 On a 100-point feeling thermometer scale, a sample ofN = 97 students (83%
female) showed amean of 31.00 (SD = 24.79) towardsUKIP voters, compared
toM = 55.60 (SD = 25.92) for Conservative voters,M = 66.66 (SD = 22.94) for
Labour, andM = 69.50 (SD = 21.14) for Greens.
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Are member-to-member generalisation processes different
for negative interactions compared to positive interactions?
Based on the observations of negativity biases in perception,
memory, and generalisation (e.g., Baumeister et al. 2001;
Shook et al. 2007), it was predicted that people should change
their investments in novel group members more strongly after
experiencing negative interactions with previous group mem-
bers, compared to positive interactions.
Hypothesis 3: Interaction valence is predicted to moder-
ate member-to-member generalisation of trust behaviour.
Generalisation will occur more strongly for negative ex-
periences than for positive experiences, due to a negativ-
ity bias. Generalization for negative experiences will be
stronger for the outgroup, in line with Hypothesis 2.
Are there between-group differences in trust recovery
after a violation? Social identity theory (Tajfel and
Turner 1979) states that people are motivated to main-
tain a positive image of the ingroup and discard of
ingroup deviants. Therefore, interactions with untrust-
worthy ingroup members should not influence trust in
novel ingroup members. However, untrustworthy outgroup
members might change the perception of the whole group
more permanently.
Hypothesis 4: Following trust violation, trust in novel
ingroup members is predicted to be quicker to recover
than trust in novel outgroup members.
Study 1
The first study examined member-to-member generalisation
of trust behaviour in a laboratory setting, utilising a British
student sample. Participants indicated their attitudes towards
the major British political parties on a feeling thermometer
scale, after which they selected their own political affiliation.
Next, the Trust Game was played with ten different partners
from participants’ own political ingroup, from a political
outgroup, or with partners with unknown political affiliation
(control). Participants always played the role of trustor in the
Trust Game, while the partners in the game were pre-
programmed by the experimenter.
Group membership of the partners was varied be-
tween-subjects, while interaction valence was varied
within-subjects.
Based on a pilot study with university students which
showed a dislike towards supporters of the UK Independence
Party (UKIP), but a positive attitude towards many other po-
litical outgroups, UKIP was selected as the target outgroup.




The participant pool consisted of 152 University students.2 As
the outgroup was set to consist of UKIP supporters, any par-
ticipant that supported UKIP, or showed no preference of their
own selected party over UKIP, was removed from analysis. To
measure the amount of preference, a difference score was
calculated between the feeling thermometer score for the se-
lected party and the feeling thermometer score for UKIP. A
cut-off score of 25 was used to determine party preference; 17
participants were removed from analysis. The remaining 135
participants (75% female, Mage = 20.96, SDage = 5.05) re-
ceived course credit or a payment of 3 pounds for their time.
In addition, participants had a chance to win their earnings in
the game, converted to pounds (one token = 50 pence), based
on a dice roll at the end of the experiment. Twenty-six partic-
ipants received the bonus; the average bonus amount was 5.75
pounds.
This study employed a mixed design with the between-
subject factor group (ingroup, outgroup, control) and the
within-subject variable trial number (1 to 10) as main predic-
tors of investments in the separate phases of the Trust Game.
The in- and outgroup were determined based on the self-
identified political affiliation of the participant. The outgroup
was set to consist of UKIP supporters, and the control group
always consisted of partners with an unknown political affil-
iation. Identification with the ingroup was measured in addi-
tion to the Trust Game data. People higher in such identifica-
tion generally show more preferential treatment toward
ingroup members (Brewer 1999); we expected this to poten-
tially effect generalisation processes for the ingroup and
outgroup. The standardized mean scores of this scale was
treated as a continuous predictor of investments.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was programmed using the Python-based pro-
gram PsychoPy (Peirce 2007) and data was collected in a
laboratory setting, with participants seated in separate cubi-
cles. Informed consent was obtained from all individual par-
ticipants included in this study. The first part of the experiment
consisted of feeling thermometer scales, the selection of a
political party, and the ingroup identification scale. The feel-
ing thermometer scales consisted of a continuous scale from
2 The sample size was based on power calculations using the coefficient and
standard error of previous studies using the same paradigm but a within-
subject design of group, using the same MatLab script as Vermue et al.
(2018). In these previous studies, the effect size of the interaction of interest
and a sample size of N = 48 resulted in an obtained power of 0.76. As this
study utilised a between-subjects design of group, a tripled sample size was
aimed for (3 * 50 = 150 participants).
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0° (very cold) to 100° (very warm), for each of the five major
political parties in the UK.3 The parties were presented by
name and with a logo to help with recognition. After partici-
pants had rated all the political parties on the feeling thermom-
eter scale, they were asked to select the political party that they
identified most with. This selection determined the presented
ingroup for the rest of the experiment. Participants next com-
pleted a 7-item ingroup identification scale (α = 0.83) adapted
from Cinnirella (1997). For the identification questionnaire,
the name of the group was set based on the selected party.
Sequential Trust Game After completing the questionnaires,
participants received instructions about the Trust Game and a
few control questions to ensure full understanding of the
game. Participants always played the game in the role of
trustor/first mover. After completing four practice rounds of
the game, participants played 10 rounds of the Trust Game.
For each partner in the game, an image of the party symbol
was shown to indicate group membership, and two initials
were displayed to indicate individual players. These partners
were presented to the participants as responses from people
who previously played the game, where the original would be
matched to the participants’ investment decisions. However,
in reality all responses were pre-programmed to show either
trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviour at specific points in
the game. Each round was played with a different individual,
but all rounds were played with only ingroup members,
outgroup members, or people of which the political affiliation
was unknown (control group). Participants were specifically
instructed that they would play only one round with each
partner. However, they were not aware of the number of
rounds that they were going to play, to avoid any possibility
of strategic changes in investments during the last rounds.
Each round of the Trust Game consisted of the following
stages: introduction of the partner, expectation rating, invest-
ment decision, overview of transaction, and feedback. If the
participant decided not to invest in the partner, the overview of
transaction stage was skipped. Participants were first intro-
duced to the partner of that round. The party symbol was
displayed when the participant interacted with an ingroup or
outgroup member. No other pictures of the partners was
shown, eliminating any effects of facial attractiveness or trust-
worthiness (van’t Wout and Sanfey 2008; Wilson and Eckel
2006). For control partners, an Baffiliation unknown^ image
was shown on the screen. Participants next indicated their
expectations regarding the reciprocity behaviour of the part-
ner, by selecting how much they thought this partner
would return to them, in percentage of the investment,
on a scale from zero to 100% of the investment. After
the expectation question, participants could decide how
much of their endowment of 10 tokens they wanted to
invest in the current partner. Any number of tokens
between zero and 10 tokens could be invested in the
partner. After the participant made their choice, an over-
view screen was displayed for 3 seconds indicating the
selected investment and the partner’s received amount
(the investment ×3). Last, participants were given feed-
back about how many tokens the current partner
returned to them, and how many tokens they had earned
in that round.
The ten rounds of the Trust Game were divided into
three separate phases. In the first three rounds of the
game, (the trust-building phase) all partners reciprocated
high amounts, between 45% and 60% of the amount
that the partner receives (investment ×3). In these
rounds, participants always ended the round with more
tokens that they started with, if they invested. In rounds
four and five (the trust-violation phase) the partners did
not reciprocate any invested tokens, irrespective of the
investment of the participant. Finally, in rounds six to
10 of the Trust Game (the trust-recovery phase), all
partners reciprocated similar high amounts as in the first
rounds. This behaviour was kept constant for all partic-
ipants, only the information about the partner (ingroup,
outgroup, or control) varied between participants.
After completing all rounds of the Trust Game, par-
ticipants were shown their average earnings in the game
and completed a number of final questionnaires4 includ-
ing questions regarding the purpose of the study and
any suspicions they might have about the experiment.5
Finally, participants rolled a dice to determine whether
they would receive the bonus payment of their average
earnings in the game, and they received a written
debriefing before exiting the room. This study was ap-
proved by the appropriate institutional research ethics
committee before data collection.
Data Analysis
The data was analysed using the statistics program R version
3.4.2 (R Core Team 2017) in RStudio (RStudio Team 2015).
The analysis was divided into three main strands. Firstly,
3 The Conservative Party, The Labour Party, The Liberal Democrats, The
Green Party, and The UK Independence Party (UKIP).
4 Outgroup attitudes were included as an exploratory measure. No directional
hypotheses were formulated for this variable, as participants experienced both
positive and negative interactions with the outgroup. As no significant effects
were found, this variable is not reported any further.
5 60% of all participants (91/152) reported no suspicions about the study.Most
participants thought the purpose of the study was related to trust and political
affiliations (97 participants mentioned the word Bpolitical^, 60 participants
mentioned the word Btrust^, and 44 participants mentioned both words).
Few participants mentioned prejudice, stereotypes, or ingroup favouritism as
an aim of the study (7 participants mentioned the word Bgroup^, 7 participants
mentioned Bprejudice^ or Bbias^). No participants suspected generalisation or
learning about a group as the aim of the study.
Curr Psychol
initial investments and expectations were compared between
the three groups using ANOVAs. Secondly, to analyse how
group membership of the partners influenced investments in
the Trust Game over time, as well as their relation to ingroup
identification, a number of different linear multilevel models
were created (also known as mixed-effects models; Baayen
et al. 2008). The effect of group (ingroup, outgroup, control)
and trial number (rounds 1 to 10) on the investments were
analysed for each phase separately.
The main effect of trial number during a phase of the game
examines the first hypothesis about member-to-member gen-
eralisation. Interactions between group and trial number indi-
cate differences in generalisation between groups, thus testing
hypothesis 2. The interaction between group and trial number
in the trust-recovery phase examines the fourth hypothesis.
A random intercept per participant, random slopes for
group and trial number, as well as the interaction between
these variables were added to obtain a maximal random struc-
ture (Barr et al. 2013). The following planned contrasts were
implemented to compare the separate groups: the contrast 1
compared the control group with the ingroup and outgroup
combined, and the contrast 2 compared the ingroup with
the outgroup. Unstandardized regression coefficients are
reported alongside inferential statistics as simple effect sizes
(Baguley 2009).
Thirdly, the amount of change in investments was com-
pared between the different phases by creating individual co-
efficients of change for each phase and running linear multi-
level models on this data. This analysis was performed to be
able to directly compare the level of trust generalisation be-
tween positive interactions in the trust-building phase and
negative interactions in the trust-violation phase, thus testing
hypothesis 3. Moreover, effects of group over phases (instead
of specifically for each phase of the game) could be examined
with this analysis, allowing for another way to examine the
second hypothesis. Lastly, the relation between investments




An ANOVA on investments in the first round of the Trust
Game showed a significant effect of group, F(2, 132) =
25.58, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.28. Post-hoc independent t-tests con-
firmed that initial investments differed significantly between
all groups (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and t-test re-
sults). Consistent with an ingroup favouritism effect, partici-
pants invested the highest amount in ingroup partners and the
lowest amount in outgroup partners. The second ANOVA on
first round expectations of return confirmed this pattern,
showing a significant effect of group, F(2, 132) = 50.37,
p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.43 (see Table 1).
Trust-Building Phase
The first model examined the effect of group, trial number,
and average mean-centred ingroup identification score on in-
vestments in the trust-building phase of the game (Round 1 to
Round 4, see Fig. 1). All main effects and interactions be-
tween these three variables were included as fixed effects in
the model. In addition, a random per subject intercept was
added, and a random slope for trial number. The fixed effects
of this model explained 22% of the variance within the data
(R2fixed = 0.22). Adding the random effects to the model in-
creased the amount of variance explained to 84% (R2total =
0.84). Significant main effects of group, F(2, 129) = 28.00,
p < .001, b1 = −0.13, t(129) = −0.82, p = .412, b2 = 1.94,
t(129) = 7.45, p < .001, and trial number, F(2,129) = 86.76,
p < .001, b = 0.49, were observed. The positive coefficient
for the main effect of trial indicates that people increased their
investments during the trust-building phase, confirming
hypothesis 1. Post-hoc multiple comparisons based on
the model show that investments differed significantly
between all groups: ingroup – outgroup, t(129) = 5.29,
p < .001, d = 0.93, ingroup – control, t(129) = −2.62,
Table 1 Mean and standard deviations for initial investments (0–10 tokens) and expectations of return in percentage of the received investment (0 to
100%) in partners from the different groups, and t-test comparisons of initial investments between groups
Mean (SD) 1 2 3
Investments
1. Ingroup (N = 46) 5.89 (2.77) –
2. Outgroup (N = 45) 2.56 (1.44) t(68) = 7.22, p < .001, d = 1.50 –
3. Control (N = 44) 4.45 (2.26) t(85) = 2.70, p = .008, d = 0.57 t(72) = −4.72, p < .001, d = 1.01 –
Expectations
1. Ingroup 53.87 (18.70) –
2. Outgroup 19.24 (13.93) t(83) = 10.03, p < .001, d = 2.10 –
3. Control 45.45 (18.30) t(87) = 2.16, p = .034, d = 0.45 t(80) = 7.59, p < .001, d = 1.61 –
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p = .027, d = 0.46, outgroup – control, t(129) = 2.61, p = .028,
d = 0.46. The least-square means as predicted from the model
for each group are: Mcontrol = 5.05 (SE = 0.31, 95% CI [4.42,
5.68]), Mingroup = 6.20 (SE = 0.30, 95% CI [5.60, 6.79]), and
Moutgroup = 3.90 (SE = 0.31, 95% CI [3.28, 4.51]),
respectively.
The Group x Trial interaction was significant as well, F(2,
129) = 12.86, p < .001, b1 = 0.05, t(129) = 1.31, p = .192, b2 =
−0.32, t(129) = −4.92, p < .001. Post-hoc comparisons of the
slopes of investments over time for the different groups show
that the slope for ingroup partners, intercept = 5.63, b = 0.22,
SE = 0.08, t(95) = 2.81, p = .006, differs significantly from the
slope for outgroup partners, intercept = 1.75, b = 0.86, SE =
0.09, t(43) = 9.08, p < .001, comparison ingroup - outgroup,
χ2(1) = 24.24, p < .001. Moreover, the slope for the outgroup
partners differed significantly from the control group,
intercept = 4.07, b = 0.39, SE = 0.04, t(42) = 3.74, p < .001,
comparison control – outgroup, χ2(1) = 12.55, p < .001. The
slopes of the ingroup and the control group were not signifi-
cantly different from each other, χ2(1) = 1.70, p = .192. These
results partially confirm hypothesis 2. The left-hand side
of Fig. 2 shows, using a boxplot of per-subject coeffi-
cients, increased change in investments for the outgroup,
over the control, which in turn was larger than for the
ingroup. The visualised coefficients were retrieved from
linear multilevel models of each phase, with the sign of
coefficients reversed for the violation phase for magnitude
comparison.
In summary, ingroup partners received the highest invest-
ments, but investments increased the least. Meanwhile,
outgroup partners received very low investments initially,
but investments increased the most across the trust-building
phase (see Fig. 1). Lastly, no significant main effect or inter-
actions with ingroup identification were observed on the in-
vestments in the trust-building phase.
Trust-Violation Phase
A second linear multilevel model was created with group, trial
number, and ingroup identification predicting investments in
Round 4 to Round 6 of the Trust Game (see Fig. 1). The same
random structure and planned contrasts for group were used.
The fixed effects of this model explained 18% of the variance
within the data (R2fixed = 0.18). Adding the random effects to
the model increased the amount of variance explained to 71%
(R2total = 0.71). In this model, only a significant main effect of
trial number was observed, F(1, 129) = 76.07, p < .001, b =
−0.81.This effect showed that investments significantly de-
creased during the trust violation phase, and thus again con-
firmed hypothesis 1. The non-significant Group x Trial inter-
action, F(2, 129) = 1.01, p = .368, b1 = −0.07, t(129) = −1.09,
p = .277, b2 = 0.10, t(129) = 0.93, p = .355, indicates that the
slope of change in investments during this phase did not differ
between the conditions, providing no evidence for the second
hypothesis during the trust-violation phase. No significant
main effect or interactions with ingroup identification were
observed on the investments in the trust-violation phase.
In summary, investments in novel partners decreased in the
trust-violation phase following the untrustworthy behaviours
of others. This was not more pronounced for the outgroup
over the ingroup.
Trust-Recovery Phase
The third linear multilevel model was performed with group,
trial number, and ingroup identification predicting invest-
ments in round six to round ten of the game (see Fig. 1).
The same random structure and planned contrasts for group
were used. The fixed effects of this model explained 12% of
the variance within the data (R2fixed = 0.12). Adding the ran-
dom effects to the model increased the amount of variance
Fig. 2 Boxplots of coefficients of investment change over trials for
the different phases of the Trust Game and for the different
















Fig. 1 Mean investments in different group partners for each round of the
Trust Game for Study 1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The dotted lines indicate the phases of the game (building, violation,
recovery)
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explained to 80.8% (R2total = 0.81). As in the trust-violation
phase, only a significant main effect of trial number was ob-
served, F(1, 128) = 28.71, p < .001, b = 0.29. This main effect
indicates that investments generally increased during the trust
recovery phase, also confirming hypothesis 1 in this phase of
the game. The non-significant Group x Trial interaction, F(2,
128) = 0.96, p = .386, b1 = 0.05, t(128) = 1.38, p = .169, b2 =
0.00, t(129) = 0.04, p = .971, indicates that the slope of change
in investments during this phase did not differ between the
groups (see Fig. 1), disconfirming hypothesis 4. No significant
main effect or interactions with ingroup identification were
observed on the investments in the trust-recovery phase.
In summary, overall investments increased during this
phase. The prediction that such recovery would occur faster
for the ingroup than the outgroup was not supported.
Comparisons of Slopes over Phases
To examine hypothesis 3 regarding stronger generalisation
after negative than positive interactions, changes in invest-
ments over time needed to be directly compared between
phases. Moreover, differences in generalisation between
groups could also be compared over the whole game (instead
of only during a specific phase of the game). Figure 2 shows
the slope coefficients of trial number (i.e. the amount of
change in investments over time) for each of the groups during
the trust building, trust violation, and trust recovery phase.
For a statistical comparison of these coefficients between
phases of the game and between groups, trial number was
regressed on investments separately for each participant and
for each phase. This analysis created an intercept and coeffi-
cient for trial number for each participant. The coefficients for
the trust violation phase were multiplied by −1 to allow for a
direct comparison the magnitude of the average slopes be-
tween the phases without the problem of the sign of the slope
(e.g. slope coefficients of +2 and − 2 are equal in magnitude,
but would be statistically different in the model).
A linear multilevel model was performed with the slope
coefficient as dependent variable and phase (building, viola-
tion, recovery) and group as predictors. A per-subject random
intercept was added to account for the repeated measures de-
sign. For the variable phase (building, violation, recovery), the
following contrasts were implemented: the first contrast com-
pared the building phase with the violation phase, the second
contrast compared the violation phase with the recovery
phase. The fixed effects of this model explained 10% of the
variance within the data (R2fixed = 0.10). Adding the random
effects to the model increased the amount of variance ex-
plained to 27.4% (R2total = 0.27.4).
Significant main effects of both phase, F(2, 264) = 16.99,
p < .001, b1 = 0.04, t(264) = 0.79, p = .430, b2 = −0.23,
t(264) = −4.61, p < .001, and group, F(2, 132) = 4.00,
p = .021, b1 = 0.05, t(132) = 1.65, p = .102, b2 = −0.13,
t(132) = −2.31, p = .022, were observed. Post-hoc tests re-
vealed that the slopes were significantly larger in the violation
phase than in the building and recovery phase (see Table 2),
indicating a stronger change in behaviour during the violation
phase, and the lowest change in investments during the recov-
ery phase. This result confirms hypothesis 3. In addition, the
average slope for the outgroup was significantly larger than
the slope for the ingroup and control group (see Table 3),
confirming hypothesis 2.
Relation between Expectations and Investments
The relation between expectations of return, as measured each
round before the participant made their investment decision,
and investments was examined. Firstly, the correlation be-
tween expectations and investments over the whole game in-
dicated a positive relation, r = 0.47, p < .001. Next, for each
phase of the game, a model was created with expectations,
group, and trial number predicting investments. The same
random structure and contrasts were used as in the previous
models. In all phases, only a significant main effect of expec-
tations on investments was found: trust-building, F(1, 291) =
25.38, p < .001, b = 0.04, trust-violation, F(1, 213) = 6.00,
p = .015, b = 0.06, trust-recovery, F(1, 196) = 4.31, p = .039,
b = 0.06. Expectations strongly predicted investments in each
phase of the game, but there was no effect of group.
Discussion
Study 1 examined how people generalise their experiences
with group members in their trust behaviour towards novel
individuals from the same group. Moreover, the role of group
membership (ingroup vs outgroup vs control) and valence
(positive vs negative) in member-to-member generalisation
process was investigated. The main research question of this
project focusses on the generalisation of experiences in the
game in trust towards novel individuals. It was predicted that
people use their previous experiences and adjust their trust in
novel individuals after experiencing positive (trust reciproca-
tion) or negative (trust violation) interactions with other mem-
bers of the same group. This hypothesis was confirmed; pre-
vious interactions strongly influenced behaviour towards nov-
el partners in all phases of the game. Investments increased
after positive interactions with previous group members and
decreased after negative interactions.
Moreover, ingroup favouritism and a dislike of the
outgroup were visible in this study As seen in Fig. 1, partici-
pants initially expected and invested much higher amounts in
ingroup partners than in control partners, and participants
invested even lower amounts in partners from the political
outgroup UKIP. A tendency continued for people to invest
more in the ingroup than the outgroup, even though
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differences from the control group were not significant in the
last two phases of the game.
Secondly, it was predicted that outgroup interactions should
be generalised more readily than experiences with ingroupmem-
bers, due to heightened homogeneity perceptions within
outgroups compared to ingroups (Judd and Park 1988; Ostrom
and Sedikides 1992; Park and Rothbart 1982). However, this
effect of group membership on generalisation was only con-
firmed for the trust-building phase. People started off strongly
distrusting outgroup members, but after experiencing positive
interactions increased their trust much more strongly towards
novel outgroup members than towards novel ingroup members.
This enhanced generalisation of outgroup interactions was not
observed in the violation- and recovery-phase of the Trust Game.
Thirdly, a general negativity effect was hypothesised.
Negative experiences should have a stronger effect on trust
behaviour towards other group members than positive experi-
ences. This hypothesis was confirmed, as changes in invest-
ments were more pronounced during the trust-violation phase
than the trust-building and -recovery phase. Lastly, it was
hypothesised that trust recovery towards novel group mem-
bers after experiencing a violation would be stronger for
ingroup members than outgroup members, and people would
be more reluctant to trust novel outgroup members than novel
ingroup members. However, the results showed a different
pattern. Even though overall investments increased less steep-
ly in the recovery phase compared to the trust-building phase,
no differences between the groups was observed. It seems
that, after establishing general levels of trust for each group
at the end of the trust-building phase, people only focussed on
previous experiences in their investment decisions and were
no longer influenced by the group membership of the partners.
In summary, the results from the first study show evidence
for member-to-member generalisation in trust behaviour.
People adjusted their behaviour towards novel group mem-
bers after experiencing positive or negative interactions with
other members of that group. The differences in slopes be-
tween the three groups in the trust-building phase demonstrate
that group membership predicted how people adjusted follow-
ing trustworthy behaviour. Specifically, people showed
ingroup favouritism in their expectations and trust but adjust-
ed their behaviour towards trustworthy outgroup members
in the first few rounds of the game. This outgroup gen-
eralisation effect did not continue through in the other
phases of the game. Moreover, negative experiences led
to a stronger change in behaviour towards novel indi-
viduals than positive experiences. The second study
aimed to replicate Study 1 in a larger and more repre-
sentative online sample where participants from different
political backgrounds could be compared.
Study 2
Study 2 was conducted using the online platform Mechanical
Turk, which has been shown to produce reliable data from
more representative samples than traditional undergraduate
samples (Gosling et al. 2010; Buhrmester et al. 2011; Casler
et al. 2013; Hauser and Schwarz 2016). This setting allowed
for a wider sample in a different country than Study 1, includ-
ing equal numbers of participants from both sides of the po-
litical spectrum to confirm effects are not specific to the par-
ticular nature of the outgroup used in Study 1. The design of
Study 1 was adapted to this online platform. Political affilia-
tion was again used as a target group, where participants indi-
cated their political affiliation by choosing either the version
of the study available for supporters of the Democratic Party
or the Republican Party.
Table 2 T-test comparisons of the
average slopes of investment
change during each of the phases
of the Trust Game
Trust building Trust violation Trust recovery
Building –
Violation t(134) = −3.66, p < .001, d = 0.31 –
Recovery t(134) = 2.39, p = .018, d = 0.44 t(134) = 5.13, p < .001
d = 0.21
–
Comparisons were made between the column header, minus the row header (i.e. building - violation, building -
recovery, violation - recovery)
Table 3 T-test comparisons of the
average slopes of investment
change for each of the groups
Ingroup Outgroup Control
Ingroup –
Outgroup t(86) = −2.23, p = .028, d = 0.47 –
Control t(88) = 0.30, p = .765,d = 0.06 t(85) = 2.53, p = .013d = 0.53 –
Comparisons were made between the column header, minus the row header (i.e. ingroup - outgroup, ingroup -




The participant pool consisted of 254 MTurk workers6 in the
United States. The data of 22 participants was removed due to
inconsistent responses related to the political affiliation and
orientation.7 The remaining 226 participants (43% female,
Mage = 37.12, SDage = 11.72) were all US citizens, and
consisted of equal numbers of self-identified Democrats and
Republicans. Participants received a payment of 0.75 US
Dollars for their time and had a chance to win a monetary
bonus based on average earnings in the Trust Game, converted
to dollars (one token = 10 cents). Ten participants were select-
ed at random to receive the bonus, with an average bonus
amount of 1.20 dollars. The same design was utilised as in
Study 1.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was programmed using the online software
program Qualtrics and was distributed via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. Informed consent was obtained from all
individual participants included in this study. Separate ver-
sions of the experiment were created for Democratic and
Republican voters and were launched separately on the
MTurk website. After informed consent was obtained and
the party screening was successful, participants completed
the ingroup identification scale. Next, participants’ feelings
towards the outgroup (either Democrats or Republicans, de-
pending on own affiliation) were measured using a feeling
thermometer.
The Trust Gamewas identical to Study 1, with 10 rounds of
the game divided into three phases, and participants played the
game rounds with 10 different individuals from either their
political ingroup, outgroup, or the control. Symbols of the
Republican and Democratic Party were used as images for
the ingroup and outgroup partners (depending on chosen af-
filiation), and the same Baffiliation unknown^ image was used
for control partners as in Study 1. After completing the 10
rounds of the game, participants completed the outgroup atti-
tudes scale and demographics questions. Participants were
informed that the winners of the bonus amount based on av-
erage earnings in the game would be notified later on, after
data collection was completed. A written debriefing was pre-
sented to participants before they submitted their answers.
This study was approved by the appropriate institutional re-
search ethics committee before data collection.
Data Analysis
The same analyses were performed as in Study 1.
Additionally, the effect of political affiliation was explored
as a predictor of investments in the game.
Results
Initial Trust Bias
An ANOVA on investments in the first round of the Trust
Game showed a significant effect of group, F(2, 223) = 4.00,
p = .020, ηp
2 = 0.04. Post-hoc independent t-tests confirmed
that initial investments in the ingroup were significantly
higher than initial investments in the outgroup and the control
group (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics and t-test statis-
tics). The outgroup and the control group did not differ signif-
icantly in their initial investments. The second ANOVA on
first round expectations of return confirmed this pattern,
showing a significant effect of group, F(2, 223) = 4.13,
p = .017, ηp
2 = 0.04 (see Table 4).
Trust-Building Phase
The first model examined the effect of group, trial number,
and average mean-centred ingroup identification score on in-
vestments in the trust-building phase of the game (Round 1 to
Round 4, see Fig. 3). The same fixed and random effects
structure was used as in Study 1. The fixed effects of this
model explained 6.9% of the variance within the data
(R2fixed = 0.07). Adding the random effects to the model
increased the amount of variance explained to 89%
(R2total = 0.89).
In this model, significant main effects of group, F(2,
220) = 3.09, p = .047, b1 = 0.27, t(220) = 1.61, p = .109, b2 =
0.56, t(220) = 1.90, p = .059, and trial number, F(1,220) =
17.29, p < .001, b = 0.18, were observed. The positive coeffi-
cient for the main effect of trial indicates that people increased
their investments during the trust-building phase, confirming
hypothesis 1. Post-hoc multiple comparisons based on the
model show that the ingroup received higher investments than
the outgroup, t(220) = 2.61, p = .027, d = 0.35, and higher in-
vestments than the control group, t(220) = −2.48, p = .037,
d = 0.33. The outgroup and the control group did not differ
in the received investments during the trust building phase,
t(220) = 0.19, p = .981, d = 0.03. The least-square means as
predicted from the model for each group are: Mcontrol = 5.25
6 The aim was to double the sample size from Study 1 to Study 2 to accom-
modate comparisons between Democrat and Republican participants.
7 All participants indicated their political affiliation, as well as voting inten-
tions (the experiment was conducted before the 2016 Presidential Election)
and political orientation (liberal to conservative) at the beginning of the exper-
iment. For 22 participants, voting intentions and ratings of political orientation
(liberal to conservative) did not match with selected affiliation (e.g. self-
identified Democrats intending to vote for Donald Trump and identifying as
very conservative).
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(SE = 0.35, 95% CI [4.55, 5.95]), Mingroup = 6.52 (SE = 0.37,
95% CI [5.79, 7.25]), andMoutgroup = 5.16 (SE = 0.37, 95% CI
[4.42, 5.88]), respectively. No differences were found in how
the investments changed over trials, as the non-significant
Group x Trial interaction indicates, F(2, 220) = 0.88,
p = .414, b1 = −0.03, t(220) = −0.98, p = .328, b2 = 0.05,
t(220) = 0.90, p = .369. This non-significant interaction dis-
confirms the second hypothesis.
A significant Group x Identification interaction was ob-
served, F(2, 220) = 4.37, p = .014, b1 = 0.02, t(220) = 0.15,
p = .878, b2 = 0.66, t(220) = 2.96, p = .003 (see Fig. 4). This
interaction indicates that the relation between ingroup identifi-
cation and investments in the trust building phase is positive for
the ingroup, intercept = 6.03, b = 0.74, SE = 0.32, t(71) = 2.32,
p = .023, and negative for the outgroup, intercept = 4.90, b =
−0.58, SE = 0.35, t(71) = −1.67, p = .099. No relation between
identification and investments was observed for the control,
intercept = 4.66, b = 0.02, SE = 0.29, t(81) = 0.07, p = .944.
Once again ingroup partners received the highest invest-
ments in this trust-building phase; the outgroup did not differ
from the control. Ingroup favouritism was particularly
pronounced for those high in ingroup identification (as seen
in Fig. 4), which led to increased investments for the ingroup,
and decreased investments for the outgroup. Unlike Study 1,
there were no between-group differences in how much invest-
ments increased.
Trust-Violation Phase
For the trust-violation phase, a second linear multilevel model
was created with group, trial number, and ingroup identifica-
tion predicting investments in Round 4 to Round 6 of the Trust
Game (see Fig. 3). The same random effects were included as
in the trust-building phase. The fixed effects of this model
explained 6.6% of the variance within the data (R2fixed =
0.07). Adding the random effects to the model increased the
amount of variance explained to 80.6% (R2total = 0.81).
In this model, a significant main effect of trial number was
observed, F(1, 220) = 8.66, p = .004, b = −0.51, which shows
that investments generally decreased during the violation
phase. This main effect again confirms hypothesis 1. Themain
effect of group was marginally significant, F(2, 220) = 2.58,
p = .078, b1 = 0.23, t(220) = 0.65, p = .519, b2 = 1.36,
Table 4 Mean and standard deviations for initial investments (0–10 tokens) and expectations of return in percentage of the received investment (0 to
100%) in partners from the different groups, and t-test comparisons of initial investments between groups
Mean (SD) 1 2 3
Investments
1. Ingroup (N = 73) 6.32 (3.35) –
2. Outgroup (N = 73) 4.92 (3.69) t(142) = 2.40, p = .018, d = 0.40 –
3. Control (N = 80) 4.98 (3.69) t(147) = 2.54, p = .012, d = 0.41 t(142) = 0.10, p = .919, d = 0.00 –
Expectations
1. Ingroup 45.81 (22.53) –
2. Outgroup 35.89 (24.85) t(142) = 2.53, p = .013, d = 0.42 –
















Fig. 3 Mean investments in different group partners for each round of the
Trust Game for Study 2. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
The dotted lines indicate the phases of the game (building, violation,
recovery)
Fig. 4 Relationship between ingroup identification and investments in
the trust-building phase of the Trust Game for Study 2. A scatterplot is
presented with separate regression lines for each group. Shaded areas
around regression lines indicate 96% confidence intervals
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t(220) = 2.18, p = .031. Post-hoc multiple comparisons based
on the model show that the ingroup received higher invest-
ments than the outgroup, t(220) = 2.94, p = .010, d = 0.40, and
higher investments than the control group, t(220) = −2.20,
p = .074, d = 0.30. The outgroup and the control group did
not differ in the received investments during the trust-
violation phase, t(220) = 0.81, p = .696, d = 0.11. The least-
square means as predicted from the model for each group
are: Mcontrol = 5.14 (SE = 0.35, 95% CI [4.45, 5.83]),
Mingroup = 6.25 (SE = 0.37, 95% CI [5.53, 6.98]), and
Moutgroup = 4.72 (SE = 0.37, 95% CI [4.00, 5.45]), respective-
ly. No differences were found in how the investments changed
over trials, as the non-significant Group x Trial interaction
indicates, F(2, 220) = 0.55, p = .576, b1 = −0.02, t(220) =
−0.33, p = .744, b2 = −0.12, t(220) = −1.00, p = .318.
In addition, the Group x Identification interaction was
again significant, F(2, 220) = 3.72, p = .026, b1 = 0.49,
t(220) = 1.77, p = .077, b2 = 0.99, t(220) = 2.12, p = .035.
This interaction indicated the same results as in the trust-
building phase. The 3-way Group x Trial x Identification in-
teraction was marginally significant, F(2, 220) = 2.50,
p = .084, b1 = −0.10, t(220) = −1.88, p = .062, b2 = −0.11,
t(220) = −1.26, p = .208. To explore the three-way interaction
in more depth, a median-split factor of ingroup identification
was created (Mdn = 4.71, Nlow = 105, Nhigh = 121). Adding
this factor to the model instead of the continuous scores pro-
duced a significant three-way interaction, F(2, 220) = 3.54,
p = .031, b1 = −0.33, t(220) = −2.50, p = .013, b2 = −0.22,
t(220) = −0.93, p = .352, see Fig. 5 and Table 5.
Separate models were created for participants that indicated
high and low identification with the ingroup. For highly iden-
tified participants, investments in the ingroup decreased more
strongly than investments in the control group, χ2 (1) = 5.80,
p = .048 (see Table 5). This Group x Trial interaction
examines hypothesis 2, but the result indicates an effect oppo-
site to the hypothesised direction. For low identifiers, no dif-
ferences were observed between the slopes of investments
in the violation phase.
As in Study 1, the trust-violation phase decreased invest-
ments overall. The tendency for higher investments in the
ingroup than the outgroup or the control group continued in
this phase. Overall, the magnitude of decrease did not differ
between ingroups and outgroups. However, participants
reporting high ingroup identification showed more decrease
in ingroup investments than for the control group.
Trust Recovery Phase
A third linear multilevel model was created with group, trial
number, and ingroup identification predicting investments in
the trust recovery phase (round 6 to 10, see Fig. 3). The same
random effects were again included. The fixed effects of this
model explained 3.8% of the variance within the data
(R2fixed = 0.04). Adding the random effects to the model in-
creased the amount of variance explained to 85.8% (R2total =
0.86). In this model, only a significant main effect of trial
number was observed, F(1, 220) = 19.81, p < .001, b = 0.18.
Thismain effect indicates that investments generally increased
during the trust-recovery phase, again confirming hypothesis
1. No significant main effect of group, F(2, 220) = 0.59,
p = .556, b1 = 0.11, t(220) = 0.42, p = .678, b2 = 0.49,
t(220) = 1.00, p = .318, or Group x Trial interaction, F(2,
220) = 0.05, p = .949, b1 = 0.005, t(220) = 0.18, p = .860,
b2 = 0.014, t(220) = 0.27, p = .787, was observed during the
trust-recovery phase. The non-significant disconfirms hypoth-
esis 4 for Study 2. This phase showed that investments in-
creased over time, with no between-group differences.
Comparisons of Slopes over Phases
To examine hypothesis 3 regarding stronger generalisation
after negative than positive interactions, changes in invest-
ments over timewere again directly compared between phases
Fig. 5 Relationship between ingroup identification and investments over
trials in the trust-violation phase for Study 2. Regression lines for each
group are presented and separate plots for high and low identifiers.
Shaded areas around regression lines indicate 96% confidence intervals
Table 5 Intercepts, unstandardized coefficients, and standard errors of
the slopes of investments in partners from different groups, presented
separately for high and low identified participants
Low identification High identification
Intercept b SE Intercept b SE
Ingroup 6.19 −0.14 0.22 12.10 −1.05*** 0.24
Outgroup 6.14 −0.17 0.29 7.41 −0.63** 0.19
Control 7.84 −0.63** 0.23 7.14 −0.32 0.21
The notations on the coefficient indicate whether the effect of trial number
on investments is significantly different from zero.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01
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and between groups. Figure 6 below shows the slope coeffi-
cients of trial number (i.e. the amount of change over time) for
each of the groups during the trust building, trust violation,
and trust recovery phase. As in Study 1, trial number was
regressed on investments separately for each participant and
for each phase to create an intercept and coefficient for trial
number for each participant. Coefficients for the trust violation
phase weremultiplied by −1 tomake the numbers positive and
allow for a direct comparison of the magnitude of the average
slopes between the phases.
A linear multilevel model was created with the slope coef-
ficient as dependent variable and the phase (building, viola-
tion, recovery) and group as predictors. A per-subject random
intercept was added to account for the repeated measures de-
sign. The same contrasts were implemented for the variable
phase (building, violation, recovery) as in Study 1. The fixed
effects of this model explained 3% of the variance within the
data (R2fixed = 0.03). Adding the random effects to the model
increased the amount of variance explained to 42.4%
(R2total = 0.42).
In this model, only a significant main effect of phase, F(2,
446) = 15.03, p < .001, b1 = 0.11, t(446) = 2.77, p = .006, b2 =
−0.11, t(446) = −2.71, p = .007, was observed. The signifi-
cance of both contrasts indicates that the slope of the violation
phase was significantly steeper than both the building and
recovery phase, confirming hypothesis 3. No main effect of
group was observed on the investment coefficients over trials,
F(2, 223) = 0.52, p = .597, b1 = −0.00, t(223) = −0.02,
p = .987, b2 = 0.06, t(223) = 1.02, p = .310, disconfirming hy-
pothesis 2. Moreover, the Group x Phase interaction was also
non-significant, F(2, 446) = 0.71, p = .584, b11 = 0.03,
t(446) = 1.03, p = .305, b21 = 0.01, t(446) = 0.20, p = .840,
b12 = 0.01, t(446) = 0.287, p = .774, b22 = −0.05, t(446) =
−0.95, p = .345.
Differences between Democrats and Republicans
For the three phases of the Trust Game, it was explored wheth-
er Democrat and Republican participants differed in their be-
haviour. For each phase, a linear multilevel model was created
with group, trial number, and political affiliation (Democrat,
Republican) predicting investments. The same random struc-
ture and contrasts were used as in the previous models. A
marginally significant Trial x Political affiliation interaction
was observed in the trust-building phase, F(1, 220) = 3.21,
p = .074, b = −0.15, and in the trust-violation phase, F(1,
220) = 5.60, p = .019, b = 0.45. For both these phases, the
slope of investments over trials was somewhat steeper for
Democrat participants, bBuilding = 0.26, SE = 0.06, t(110) =
4.04, p < .001, bViolation = −0.74, SE = 0.13, t(110) = −5.86,
p < .001, than Republican participants, bBuilding = 0.10, SE =
0.06, t(110) = 1.85, p = .068, bViolation = −0.29, SE = 0.14,
t(110) = −2.00, p = .048. No effects of political affiliation were
observed in the trust recovery phase, Trial x Political affilia-
tion, F(1, 220) = 0.44, p = .509, b = −0.05.
Relation Between Expectations and Investments
The relation between expectations of return and investments
was again examined. Firstly, the correlation between expecta-
tions and investments over the whole game indicated a posi-
tive relation, r = 0.65, p < .001. Next, for each phase of the
game, a model was created with expectations, group, and trial
number predicting investments. The same random structure
and contrasts were used as in the previous models. In all
phases, only a significant main effect of expectations on in-
vestments was found: trust-building, F(1, 442) = 60.56,
p < .001, b = 0.04, trust-violation, F(1, 281) = 26.44,
p < .001, b = 0.09, trust-recovery, F(1, 463) = 48.00,
p < .001, b = 0.08. Expectations strongly predicted invest-
ments in each phase of the game, but there were no effects
of group.
Discussion
Study 2 examined member-to-member generalisation in trust
behaviour in a larger and more representative sample, to ex-
amine the role of ingroup identification in moderating gener-
alisation processes. Moreover, Study 2 contained an equal
number of participants from opposing political groups; this
was not controlled for in Study 1. Four main findings were
replicated from Study 1. Firstly, a clear effect of previous
game experiences was observed, again confirming the first
hypothesis. Participants increased and decreased their invest-
ments in new, unknown group members based on the trust-
worthiness of other group members. Secondly, ingroup
favouritism in trust decisions was observed in the game.
Fig. 6 Boxplots of coefficients of investment change over trials for
the different phases of the Trust Game and for the different
groups, for Study 2
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Both Democrats and Republicans showed higher trust when
interacting with partners from their own political group more
than when interacting with partners from the political
outgroup. Thirdly, investments changed more strongly after
negative interactions in the trust-violation phase than after
positive interactions in the trust-building and trust-recovery
phase, again confirming hypothesis 3. Lastly, Study 2 again
showed no differentiation between groups on trust recovery
after violation, indicating that people were equally likely to
trust new ingroup as outgroup members after experiencing
trust violations and trust reciprocation.
Unlike Study 1, an effect of ingroup identification was
observed. People who highly identified with their political
ingroup showed the strongest levels of ingroup favouritism,
while people with less ingroup identification showed
outgroup favouritism. The differences between the two studies
in effects of ingroup identification could be due to the oppo-
sitional nature of American political parties, where identifica-
tion with one party almost automatically implies opposition to
the other party (Iyengar andWestwood 2015). However, in the
multiple party system in the UK, most political parties are not
explicitly constructed in opposition to UKIP. People who
might not strongly identify with one party, may particularly
be in opposition to UKIP, and therefore identification with
these other parties might be a weaker predictor of behaviour.
When examining the effect of group membership, differ-
ences were only found at initial investment levels (i.e. an
initial ingroup bias) and during the violation phase of the
Trust Game. Participants increased their investments at similar
rates for all groups during the trust-building phase and the
trust-recovery phase. However, when participants encoun-
tered negative behaviour from other partners in the violation
phase, group information became more important.
Surprisingly, the results only showed an effect of group mem-
bership during the violation phase for participants who highly
identified with their political ingroup. High ingroup identifiers
showed a stronger decrease in investments for the ingroup
than for the control group (i.e. unknown affiliation).
Changes in investments in outgroup partners did not signifi-
cantly differ from the other groups. For low identifying par-
ticipants, no differences were found between investments for
partners from the different conditions. Thus, the second hy-
pothesis about stronger outgroup generalisation than ingroup
generalisation was not confirmed.
To summarise, Study 2 again showed that 1) people use
previous experiences with other group members to inform
their current decisions to trust, and 2) member-to-member
generalisation in trust behaviour is stronger for negative inter-
actions than positive interactions. Moreover, people who
highly identify with the ingroup favour their ingroup in trust
decisions, and show stronger generalisation of ingroup viola-
tions of trust than violations from the outgroup or a control
where group membership is unknown.
General Discussion
The aim of this research was to examine how people use their
previous experience with in- and outgroup members to inform
their decisions to trust new, unknown individuals from the
same group, a process we describe as member-to-member
generalisation. Intergroup contact research demonstrates that
positive and negative experiences with individual outgroup
members correspondingly change attitudes towards their
group as a whole (e.g. Brown and Hewstone 2005;
Pettigrew et al. 2011). To examine whether actual behaviour
towards novel individual group members is also influenced by
such contact encounters a paradigm was designed where peo-
ple interacted through a series of Trust Games with different
members from the ingroup, outgroup, or a control (with no
group information). We predicted that people generalise their
experiences with group members in their trust towards novel
individuals from that same group, and that this generalisation
is enhanced for outgroup members compared to ingroup
members, and for negative compared to positive interactions.
Both experiments showed an effect of previous interactions
on investments in unknown partners, indicating member-to-
member generalisation. People were not just guided by their
group-based biases in decisions to trust, nor were they
completely individuating the novel individual. Rather, they
adjusted their behaviour towards novel individuals of the
same group based on past experiences. The amount of adjust-
ment depended at least partially on the individual’s group
membership. Between-group differences in generalisation
were observed in the trust building phase in Study 1, and
group identification moderated responses to trust-building
and trust-violation in Study 2. Both studies consistently
showed stronger generalisation of negative experiences than
positive experiences, confirming hypotheses based on the
negativity bias (Baumeister et al. 2001; Fazio et al. 2004;
Rozin and Royzman 2001; Shook et al. 2007). In the context
of the Trust Game, reducing investments in untrustwor-
thy partners is more important to maintaining a profit
than increasing investments in trustworthy partners, as
the first option prevents losses, while the second option
only increases gains. Furthermore, the hypothesised
stronger recovery of trust for ingroup partners than
outgroup partners was not confirmed in either study.
After experiencing negative interactions with ingroup
or outgroup partners, participants increased their trust
again during the recovery phase.
Although a strict tit-for-tat strategy is illogical for novel
partners, participants appear to be influenced more by their
immediate previous experience (trustworthiness in the previ-
ous round), than by experiences that were further in the past
(trust violation a few rounds back). However, increases in trust
were weaker in the trust-recovery phase than in the trust-
building phase. This indicates that people had become more
Curr Psychol
cautious in trusting novel group partners after experiencing
violations of trust.
Interestingly, the two experiments showed different find-
ings regarding the effect of group membership on member-to-
member generalisation. Study 1 found that initial dislike of the
outgroup led to a stronger increase in trust towards novel
outgroup members during the trust-building phase of the
game. After that, similar levels of trust towards novel ingroup
and outgroup members was established. Study 2 found that
people who highly identified with the ingroup showed the
highest trust in ingroup partners. However, the effect of group
on generalisation of trust only occurred in the trust-violation
phase for highly identified participants. People who strongly
cared about their political ingroup, and therefore highly
trusted their ingroup, decreased their trust in novel ingroup
members more quickly than towards outgroup or control
group members. We propose that these two contrasting find-
ings can be explained together through expectancy-violation
effects.
Expectancy-Violation in Trust Behaviour
The stronger changes in trust behaviour towards untrustwor-
thy ingroup partners and trustworthy outgroup partners could
be explained through the lens of an expectancy-violation ef-
fect. Research indicates that people respond more strongly to
unexpected information than expected information. Exposure
to group members behaving in a stereotype-incongruent man-
ner leads to stronger affective arousal and more extreme eval-
uations of the group members, compared to stereotype-
congruent behaving group members (Bartholow et al. 2001;
Bettencourt et al. 1997; Kernahan et al. 2000).
Moreover, behaviour that is incongruent with expectations
or person impressions receives higher levels of cognitive pro-
cessing and leads to better memory than congruent behaviour
(Hamilton and Sherman 1996; Stangor and McMillan 1992).
This effect occurs because a violation of expectations has a
stronger information value and requires a change in response,
whereas a confirmation of expectations conveys a signal to
continue unchanged. Our results suggest that member-to-
member generalisation in the game was not just driven by
group membership or valence of the previous interaction,
but also by how the previous experience related to expecta-
tions and general impressions of the group.
When people showed strong distrust of the outgroup
(Study 1) or were highly identified with the ingroup (Study
2), they changed their behaviour towards novel partners more
after experiencing incongruent interactions. Together, these
two experiments with the adapted Trust Game paradigm offer
some evidence that expectancy-violation effects can transfer
from one group member to the next. This may be a potential
driving force of generalisation of previous experiences in
informing decisions to trust novel group members.
Limitations and Future Directions
Three limitations of this research need to be addressed. Firstly,
a between-subject design was adopted to manipulate group
membership of the partners. The choice of this design was a
practical consideration, as a fully random order within-subject
design would not allow for analysis of the effect of direct
previous positive or negative experiences with a certain group
on current decisions to trust and might create spill-over effects
between groups. A blocked within-subject design would most
likely lead participants to notice the pattern of trustworthy and
untrustworthy behaviour that the partners displayed.
However, a between-subjects design is limited in that it cannot
establish intergroup bias on an individual level.
Secondly, high levels of individual variation in invest-
ment behaviour (i.e. majority of explained variance aris-
ing from random effects for participants) and inconsisten-
cy between studies of the effect of group membership
create some difficulty in drawing conclusions about dif-
ferences in ingroup and outgroup member-to-member
generalisation. The observed variance in effects could be
influenced by the large scope of potential investment de-
cisions in the Trust Game (0–10) and could potentially be
minimised by using a different type of cooperative game
with more limited behavioural options and strategies.
Restricting the response options to a binary Trust Game
(i.e. trust vs not-trust, reciprocate vs not-reciprocate) will
reduce individual variance in behaviour, and might pro-
duce more stable effects of group membership. However,
a binary Trust Game cannot capture incremental changes
in trust over time, as was demonstrated in the current
research.
Thirdly, while the Trust Game paradigm provides a con-
trolled setting in which to study social interactions and quan-
tify trust, the paradigm also lacks external validity (Winking
and Mizer 2013). Therefore, it can be difficult to draw con-
clusions about daily life experiences of intergroup interac-
tions. Moreover, as the Trust Game was played with virtual
players, there was no physical interaction where people could
see each other or communicate with each other. Recent studies
have shown that real, physical interactions in economic games
can have rather different results than virtual interactions (e.g.
Bhogal et al. 2016).
Future research should seek to replicate the observed ef-
fects and explore further the role of expectancy-violation in
these effects. These two experiments were the first to use
this paradigm to examine member-to-member generalisation
of trust behaviour. Interesting findings regarding generalisa-
tion, favouritism, and negativity-biases were consistently ob-
served in the two studies. The first step for future work is to
examine the robustness of this effect in large-scale replica-
tions, utilising different target groups and samples.
Moreover, future work should examine member-to-member
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generalisation in a more natural and realistic setting. This
could potentially be achieved by using different types of
tasks and interactions, using face-to-face paradigms, such
as cooperative tasks with ingroup or outgroup participants
or confederates.
Furthermore, the effects of group membership that were
observed in the two studies suggest an effect of expectancy-
violation in the generalisation of trust behaviour towards nov-
el group members. Expectations of trustworthiness of partners
correlated strongly with investment behaviour in the game,
making this explanation plausible. However, for a systematic
test of the influence of expectancy-violation, expectations
about the partners and the groups should be measured and
manipulated prior to the game for a direct comparison. In
general, we look forward to future research that will examine
this important but under-researched type of generalisation,
and how it applies to the formation and change of pro-social
behaviour.
Conclusions
This research examined how previous interactions with
ingroup or outgroup members can influence trust behaviour
towards novel individuals from the same group, thereby
extending the intergroup contact literature beyond attitudes.
The findings from two experiments show evidence for
member-to-member generalisation; people are strongly in-
fluenced by their previous experiences with group members
in forming decisions to trust novel group members. This
effect is particularly strong for negative interactions, indi-
cating a negativity bias. Moreover, violations of expecta-
tions and beliefs about the groups could be a driving force
of the level of generalisation. People responded more
strongly to negative interactions with trusted ingroup part-
ners, or to positive interactions with distrusted outgroup
partners. Future research should seek to replicate these
findings in more natural settings, and explore further the
role of expectancy-violation.
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